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EDGY ANIMAL WELFARE
RICHARD L. CUPP, JR.t
ABSTRACT
Legal animal welfare proponents should not reject out-of-hand re-
forms that may be celebrated by some as steps toward a radical version of
animal rights.' Rather, animal welfare proponents should consider the
costs, risks, and benefits of all potential reforms. Some potential reforms'
risks and costs outweigh their benefits. But, both to improve animals' wel-
fare and to avoid irrelevance in an evolving society, legal animal welfare
advocates should be willing to tolerate some costs and risks. Walking on
the edge of slippery slopes is in some situations better than avoiding the
slopes altogether. Connecticut's 2016 animal advocacy statute provides an
illustration of legal reform that legal animal welfare proponents should
embrace even though it presents some risks of being perceived as a step
toward a radical legal personhood rights paradigm.
I. THE SLIPPERY RHETORIC OF "ANIMAL RIGHTS"
This Essay addresses navigating slippery rhetoric and slippery slopes.
A September 2017 article in the New York Times illustrates the kind of
slippery rhetoric at issue.2 The article's headline stated: Guggenheim,
Bowing to Animal Rights Activists, Pulls Works from Show.3 The article
described a controversial work in a show at New York's Solomon R. Gug-
genheim Art Museum as "a video of 'Dogs That Cannot Touch Each
Other,' in which four pairs of dogs try to fight one another but struggle to
touch because they are on nonmotorized treadmills.'A The article reported
that the museum withdrew the show "after it had come under unrelenting
pressure from animal rights supporters and critics over works in the exhi-
bition."5
t John W. Wade Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I thank Don Buf-
faloe for his outstanding work in assisting me with this Essay as a research librarian.
I. For the sake of brevity, this Essay will refer to nonhuman animals as "animals."
2. See Matthew Haag, Guggenheim, Bowing to Animal-Rights Activists, Pulls Works from
Show, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2ypdA5P.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The reference to "critics" as well as "animal-rights supporters" in the article's text may
reflect recognition that not only animal rights supporters applied pressure to the Guggenheim to pull
the exhibits. However, this nuance is not reflected in the article's headline.
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The People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) was one of
the organizations that challenged the Guggenheim exhibition.
6 PETA ad-
vocates for animal rights.7 But the only other group specifically identified
in the article as challenging the exhibition was the American Kennel Club
(AKC). 8 The AKC was quoted as protesting that dogfighting "should not
be displayed in any manner and certainly not as art." 9
Despite the New York Times headline, the AKC does not view itself
as an "animal rights" organization.'0 The organization describes itself as
"the largest purebred dog registry in the world."" Many people who de-
scribe themselves as animal rights activists oppose breeding dogs.'
2 In re-
jecting animal rights language, the AKC instead says it supports "animal
welfare." 3 Although it rejects animal rights, the AKC takes positions
against what it views as animal cruelty, as demonstrated in the Guggen-
heim art exhibit protests.14
Was the New York Times's headline wrong? The renowned torts
scholar William Prosser wrote that the nebulous concept of proximate
cause is "all things to all men."'5 Few legal constructs are more slippery
than proximate cause, and Dean Prosser's quote provides an analogy. Per-
haps "animal rights" in law means all things to all people.
As with proximate cause, the existence of countless shades of nuance
does not prevent us from identifying in broad outline some prominent
views regarding the nature of legal animal rights. Two significant inter-
pretations of legal animal rights, one of which has a quite loose subset,
may be recognized. The first, which provides a low bar, asserts that be-
cause laws exist to protect animals, animals have legal rights.'
6 If this were
the consensus definition of legal animal rights, the term's problematic as-
pects would be greatly lessened, although they would still be considerable.
The loose subset of this interpretation is "followed" by individuals who
have not given much thought to the nature of the term animal rights, but
6. Id.
7. PETA's mission statement describes itself as "the largest animal rights organization in the
world." About PETA, PETA, https://www.peta.org/about-peta (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
8. See Haag, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. See About, AM. KENNEL CLUB, http://www.akc.org/about (last visited Mar. 3, 2018).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Animal Rights Uncompromised: There's No Such Thing as a 'Responsible
Breeder,' PETA, https://www.peta.org/about-peta/why-peta/responsible-breeders (last visited Mar.
18, 2018) ("[A]s long as dogs and cats are dying in animal shelters and pounds because of a lack of
homes, no breeding can be considered 'responsible."').
13. See Understanding the Diference Between Animal Rights and Animal Welfare, AM.
KENNEL CLUB (Mar. 6, 2017), http://www.akc.org/content/news/articles/difference-between-animal-
rights-animal-welfare.
14. Id.; Haag, supra note 2.
15. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 284 (3d ed. 1964).
16. The author has addressed the various meanings that might be ascribed to "animal rights" in
more depth in Richard L. Cupp Jr., Animals as More than "Mere Things," but Still Property: A Call
for Continuing Evolution of the Animal Welfare Paradigm, 84 U. CIN. L. REv. 1023, 1041-45.
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who view it simply as being good to animals. To many in the public, sup-
porting animal rights in law may mean simply the same thing as supporting
laws that promote humane treatment of animals with little or no thought
given to the implications of labelling these legal protections as rights.
A much more demanding definition of legal animal rights is that they
would only truly exist were animals to have some form of legal person-
hood and to have the power, through some form of legal guardian, to assert
their interests in courts.17 In addition to being more demanding, this inter-
pretation is more explosive in its societal implications. If this version of
rights were granted to all animals capable of suffering pain, society would
likely undergo dramatic upheaval. Most current uses of mammals and
other vertebrates (e.g., food, clothing, and the use of such animals in test-
ing to achieve medical breakthroughs) would arguably have to end. Efforts
to attain legal personhood for particularly intelligent animals such as chim-
panzees are aimed at developing such rights for at least some animals to
break through the legal "wall" between humans and animals.'8
An animal welfare paradigm, which seeks appropriate care for ani-
mals but which rejects the notion of legal rights for animals, is presently
the dominant approach to animal protection laws in the United States.19
Animal welfare focuses on humans' responsibility to balance human in-
terests and the appropriate treatment of animals.20 However, although an-
imal welfare advocates reject rights concepts, in many or most instances
the practical interests of both major groups of animal rights advocates and
animal welfare may overlap.2 1 Most plausible legal reform efforts at pre-
sent are directed toward preventing animal cruelty rather than directly
challenging animals' legal status, and sincere supporters of animal welfare
as well as animal rights supporters wish to prevent animal cruelty.22
Legal reform regarding animals is proceeding at a rapid pace,23 and
supporters of an animal rights paradigm are often its most vocal propo-
nents. Not surprisingly, many animal rights advocates may celebrate ad-
vances in animal protection laws as steps that they hope will facilitate
eventually winning recognition of legal rights and personhood for animals.
As demonstrated in the New York Times' Guggenheim article headline,
media organizations often conflate animal welfare and animal rights.2 4
17. Mary Anne Warren has provided a thoughtful discussion of the "strong" animal rights po-
sition versus a softer position still described as supporting animal rights. See generally Mary Anne
Warren, Difficulties with the Strong Animal Rights Position, 2 BETWEEN SPECIES 163, 163-64 (1986).
18. See Richard L. Cupp, Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal Per-
sonhood, 69 FLA. L. REV. 465, 513-17 (2017) (asserting that courts should focus on an evolving ani-
mal welfare paradigm rather than accepting animal legal personhood).
19. Id. at 516-17.
20. Cupp, supra note 16, at 1038.
21. Id. at 1030-34.
22. Id.
23. Cupp, supra note 18, at 470-72 (addressing the rapid evolution of public opinion and legal
reform to provide more protection to animals).
24. See Haag, supra note 2.
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This conflation may benefit proponents of more extreme interpretations of
animal rights because it may promote an impression that advocating for
animal protection is equivalent to advocating for a rights paradigm.
Animal welfare proponents should be concerned about the potential
for a gradual slide into an animal rights paradigm, eased along by the com-
monplace error of conflating animal protection and animal rights advo-
cacy. However, opposition to legal rights for animals should not equate to
opposition to any reform that might be argued to provide some sort of step
toward legal rights for animals. This is so even regarding reforms that may
be proclaimed to be steps toward the more extreme interpretations of legal
animal rights, such as support for animal legal personhood. Rather, animal
welfare proponents must balance the benefits of each potential reform to
animals' well-being against its risks on a case-by-case basis, and must ac-
tively support proposed reforms whose benefits in protecting animals out-
weigh their risks and costs. To do otherwise would not only shirk human
responsibility to appropriately protect animals. It would also imperil the
very existence of the animal welfare paradigm in a rapidly evolving soci-
ety.
II. CONNECTICUT'S 2016 STATUTE ALLOWING JUDGES TO APPOINT
ADVOCATES FOR JUSTICE IN ANIMAL CRUELTY PROSECUTIONS: AN
ILLUSTRATION OF BENEFITS OUTWEIGHING RISKS
A. A Statute Representing the Interests ofJustice
In late 2016, Connecticut enacted a statute that provides an illustra-
tion of the kind of legal reform that animal welfare proponents should em-
brace, despite it having some slippery-slope potential as a step toward an-
imal legal personhood.25 The 2016 law, Section 54-86n of the Connecticut
General Statutes Annotated, is entitled "Appointment of advocate in pro-
ceeding re the welfare or custody of a cat or dog. Advocate's duties. De-
partment of Agriculture to maintain list of eligible advocates"
26 (the Act).
The Act gives judges the option of appointing a separate representative "to
represent he interests of justice" in animal cruelty prosecutions involving
cats and dogs.2 7 Under the Act, judges may appoint such representatives
on their own initiative or upon the motion of a party to the litigation or
counsel for any party.2 8 Judges have discretion regarding whether to ap-
point a representative.2 9
The Act provides that a list of potential representatives will be kept
by the state's Department of Agriculture.3 0 The list includes as follows:
25. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86n (West 2016).
26. Id.
27. Id. § 54-86n(a).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id
[Vol. 95:4868
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[A]ttorneys with knowledge of animal law issues and the legal system
and a list of law schools that have students, or anticipate having stu-
dents, with an interest in animal issues and the legal system. Such at-
tomeys and law students shall be eligible to serve on a voluntary basis
as advocates under this section.
The Act's summary described its purpose as being "[t]o permit the
use of animal advocates in certain legal proceedings relating to neglected
or cruelly treated animals."32 Appointed advocates may do the following:
(1) Monitor the case; (2) consult any individual with information that
could aid the judge or fact finder and review records relating to the
condition of the cat or dog and the defendant's actions, including, but
not limited to, records from animal control officers, veterinarians, and
police officers; (3) attend hearings; and (4) present information or rec-
ommendations to the court pertinent to determinations that relate to the
interests of justice, provided such information and recommendations
shall be based solely upon the duties undertaken pursuant to this sub-
section.33
B. The Act's Slippery-Slope Risks
Virtually all legal reforms providing stronger protections for animals
have at least some potential to contribute to the slipperiness of a slope that
could cause society to slide downward into a harmful animal rights legal
paradigm. This is because any time law evolves to give more protections
to animals it brings legal requirements regarding them at least a bit closer
to legal requirements regarding humans. But, of course, the existence of
some risk of harm emphatically cannot be a basis for rejecting all pro-
animal reforms. Some risks are great, but many risks are manageable.
Some potential reform would dramatically improve animals' welfare, and
some potential reform would only marginally or debatably improve their
welfare. These variables must be balanced in determining whether a par-
ticular reform measure is desirable.
Some groups that might be associated with supporting an animal wel-
fare paradigm apparently concluded that the Connecticut Act's risks or
utility costs outweighed its benefits and thus opposed the animal advocate
bill at least at some point along its path toward becoming a law.34 The
AKC, which, as noted above, describes itself as an animal welfare propo-
nent35 and which was noted in the New York Times article described above
as one of the groups opposing the Guggenheim exhibits on animal cruelty
31. Id. § 54-86n(c).
32. H.B. 5344, 2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2016) (enacted).
33. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86n(b) (West 2016).
34. See, e.g., Steve Pessah, Animal "Advocates" Bill Resurrected in Connecticut Legislature,
Hearing Scheduled 4/1, AM. KENNEL CLUB (Mar. 30, 2015), http://www.akc.org/government-rela-
tions/legislative-alerts/connecticut-house-bill-6187.
35. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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grounds,36 at least initially opposed the Connecticut law.
37 It listed among
its concerns "the potential for legal confusion about who will be ultimately
responsible for making decisions impacting animals if an advocate partic-
ipates in a case, and providing advocates akin to guardians ad litem that
are traditionally used to protect the interests of minors and other people
lacking legal capacity."38
The Connecticut General Assembly's Judiciary Committee released
a report dated March 28, 2016, that reflected opposition from two other
animal-related organizations at that time.39 A representative of the Con-
necticut Federation of Dog Clubs and Responsible Dog Owners, Inc.'s op-
position was described as follows:
The CFD believes this measure is ill advised and should be defeated.
Third party interference with the ownership rights of animal owners
will degrade the rights of all animal owners. Since in the case of animal
cruelty allegations, animal welfare is already overseen by state and lo-
cal officials, appropriate safeguards currently exist to ensure animal
cruelty is identified and punished. This bill is not necessary for the
adjudication process.40
The Connecticut Veterinary Medical Association (CVMA) also op-
posed the bill, at least at that time.4 1 The CVMA representatives' opposi-
tion was described as follows:
Animals already enjoy special legal protections. We have concerns
that the creation of animal advocates may at some point in the future
be used to interfere with medical choices made by an animal owner
and if those choices, although not cruel, are perceived by another as
inadequate[, w]e do not want it to interfere with the veterinary client
relationship in making medical decisions.42
This Essay notes "at least at that time" regarding some groups' oppo-
sition43 because the legislature made a significant amendment to the bill
after the March 2016 Judiciary Committee report that reflected some of
the opposition,44 and the opposition may have been voiced before this sig-
nificant change.
36. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
37. See Pessah, supra note 34.
38. Id.
39. CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. J. COMM. JUDICIARY, JOINT FAVORABLE REPORT (Conn. 2016),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/JFR/h/2016HB-05344-ROOJUD-JFR.htm.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See supra text accompanying note 41.
44. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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The amendment o the Connecticut bill's language in April 2016 sig-
nificantly lessened, but did not eliminate, the law's slippery-slope poten-
tial. A version of the bill dated April 13, 2016, set forth that the appointed
advocates would "advocate for an animal's best interests or the interests
of justice.'45 Two weeks later, a revised version of the bill dropped the
language addressing advocating for "an animal's best interests," and in-
stead focused only on a charge "to advocate for the interests of justice."46
This revised approach setting forth only that the advocate would represent
the interests of justice is in essence reflected in the law's final version.4 7
As addressed below, assigning an advocate for the interests of justice
is substantially different from, and substantially less problematic than, the
earlier language of advocating for the animal's best interest or the interests
of justice.48 But part of the Act's ongoing slippery-slope risk is that even
with the significantly less dangerous language, the public may believe that
Connecticut has stepped closer to treating animals like humans than is ac-
tually the case. If such misperceptions develop, they could lend an unmer-
ited sense of legitimacy to concepts such as animal legal personhood.
For example, in June 2017, National Public Radio's (NPR) website
published an article entitled In a First, Connecticut's Animals Get Advo-
cates in the Courtroom.49 The article's first sentence read, "A Connecticut
law makes it the first state to provide animals with court-appointed advo-
cates to represent them in abuse and cruelty cases, similar to laws that pro-
vide for victim's or children's advocates."50 Dr. Nancy Halpern, an attor-
ney and veterinarian who writes for the blog Animal Law Update from an
animal welfare perspective, challenged NPR's spin on the Act." She
blogged, "[d]espite that representation, the law is not similar to others
providing for representation of children," and she highlighted the statute's
52sole focus on advocates representing the interests of justice.
45. CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE LEGIS. RES., OLR BILL ANALYSIS: sHB 5344 (Conn. 2016),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/BA/2016HB-05344-R000591 -BA.htm.
46. CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE LEGIS. RES., OLR BILL ANALYSIS: SHB 5344 (AS AMENDED
BY HOUSE "A") (Conn. 2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/BA/2016HB-05344-R01 0740-BA.htm.
47. The enacted Act's wording is slightly different but essentially the same: in relevant part it
reads "to represent the interests ofjustice." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86n (West 2016). The April
27, 2016 version in relevant part read "to advocate for the interests of justice in certain proceedings
involving animals." CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE LEGIS. RES., OLR BILL ANALYSIS: SHB 5344 (AS
AMENDED BY HOUSE "A") (Conn. 2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/BA/2016HB-05344-
R010740-BA.htm.
48. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
49. Laurel Wamsley, In a First, Connecticut's Animals Get Advocates in the Courtroom, NPR
(June 2, 2017, 5:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/02/531283235/in-a-first-
connecticuts-animals-get-advocates-in-the-courtroom.
50. Id.
51. Nancy E. Halpern, Connecticut Advocates for Justice, Not Animals, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP
(June 14, 2017), https://animallaw.foxrothschild.com/2017/06/14/connecticut-advocates-for-justice-
not-animals.
52. Id.
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Dr. Halpern's concerns are legitimate. Further, to the extent that the
Act is perceived as making animals more like children in the eyes of the
law, it may be viewed as creating a stepping stone toward the harmful
concept of animal legal personhood. No legal reform may be considered
in complete isolation without regard for how it might influence other po-
tential changes. Thus, the Connecticut Act creates a bit of a slippery slope.
However, its slope is not slippery or steep enough to make support for the
statute unwise, particularly in light of the law's potential benefits for ani-
mal welfare. It presents a slope that should be traversed, but thoughtfully
traversed to limit the risk of harm.
C. The Connecticut Act's Anti-Cruelty Benefits Outweigh Its Risks
As introduced above, while it was still a bill, the Connecticut Act's
originally proposed language was more dangerous than the language the
legislature ultimately adopted. The earlier draft's language that included
advocating for "an animal's best interests" was deleted, and as enacted the
",53
Act focused only on a charge "to advocate for the interests of justice.
Professor Jessica Rubin, who was active in initiating the Act, has ex-
plained that this change was made in response to concerns that allowing
the advocate to represent the interests of the animal "would create legal
standing for animals."54 Professor Rubin wrote:
Initially I was reluctant to accept this change because I feared that it
would weaken the advocate's role. In fact, in practice it has proven to
be an excellent change because the phrase 'interests of justice' allows
consideration of a wider class of interests, including those of commu-
nity safety, other animals and other potential victims.
55
Directing only that the advocate pursue the interests of justice rather
than including advocacy for the best interests of the animal makes the ad-
vocate's role more akin to that of a prosecutor than that of a guardian ad
litem. The Animal Legal Defense Fund recognized this in an article pub-
lished on its website analyzing the Connecticut Act.56 The article noted:
[S]ome have compared the court-appointed advocates allowed under
Desmond's Law [an informal name advocates have used for the law]
to guardians ad litem, who can be appointed by courts to represent the
interests of unborn humans, infants, minors, and mentally incompetent
persons for the duration of a legal proceeding.
57
53. See CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE LEGIS. RES., OLR BILL ANALYSIS: SHB 5344 (AS
AMENDED BY HOUSE "A") (Conn. 2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/BA/2016HB-053
44 -
R010740-BA.htm.
54. JESSICA RUBIN, DESMOND'S LAW: LEGISLATION AND IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 7
(2017).
55. Id. at 7-8.
56. Nicole Pallotta, Unique Connecticut Law Allows Court-Appointed Advocates to Represent
Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND (June 21, 2017), http://aldf.org/blog/unique-connecticut-law-al-
lows-court-appointed-advocates-to-represent-animals.
57. Id.
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The article responded to these comparisons by noting the following:
Though an important and innovative legal development, the represen-
tation provided for under Desmond's Law seems to stop short of grant-
ing guardian ad litem status. According to the statutory language, ad-
vocates are appointed to represent he "interests of justice" rather than
those of the animal. In this sense, Desmond's Law advocates share the
same responsibility as prosecutors (who also have a duty to act in the
interest of justice in all criminal cases) and does not specifically posi-
tion the advocates as prioritizing the needs of animal victims. How-
ever, the interests of justice are likely to coincide with the interests of
the animal in an abuse case, or will help prevent future victimization
of other animals (e.g. rehoming the animal rather than returning her to
an abusive owner, or sentencing provisions that prohibit a convicted
abuser from having animals for a set period of time).58
The Act's legislative history reflects that much of the testimony of-
fered in support of the Act focused on animal and human welfare argu-
ments rather than on trying to make dogs' and cats' legal statuses akin to
children's legal status. Two recurring themes in testimony provided in sup-
port of the Act were the belief that research resources provided by the vol-
unteers would be helpful to prosecutors and judges in attaining appropriate
convictions, and that more effective prosecutions of animal abusers would
protect against abuse of humans because those who abuse animals often
also abuse humans.59
The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(ASPCA) expressed support illustrative of the first recurring theme. The
ASPCA's support was summarized as follows:
The appointment of court advocates in cruelty law prosecutions would
likely result in proceedings that are more balanced, efficient, and just.
80% of all cases end in withdrawal or dismissal, while 1.5% [of the]
cases are charged as felonies. This is at no cost to the legal system to
quickly obtain and share information with each party and the court.60
The second recurring theme was illustrated by the Connecticut Bar
Association's Animal Law Section.6 1 This group's support was summa-
rized as follows:
This bill will facilitate meaningful outcomes in animal abuse cases.
This is critical because of the significant link between animal abuse
and domestic, as well as other types, of violence. The FBI has recently
decided to collect statistics on animal abuse the way it does for serious
crimes. By appointing an advocate at the court's discretion, the court
58. Id.
59. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
60. CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. J. COMM. JUDICIARY, JOINT FAVORABLE REPORT (Conn. 2016),
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/JFR/h/2016HB-05344-ROOJUD-JFR.htm.
61. Id.
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has the means to avail itself of more in-depth information related to a
serious offense.62
This theme, which was echoed by multiple other supporters of the
bill, 6 3 reflects a primary rationale relied upon by many states when they
adopted legislation allowing extreme animal abuse to be charged as a fel-
ony rather than as only a misdemeanor. Until fairly recently most states
did not allow severe animal cruelty to be charged as a felony.6 4 However,
by 2014, all states had amended their laws to allow felony charges in ap-
65
propriate cases. Many states justified these enhanced penalties at least in
part based on the threat animal abusers pose to other humans.
66 This re-
flects that the statute is not even solely focused on animal welfare; it is
good for humans as well as for animals.
For several reasons-among them, that the Act provides free legal
resources that may help remedy the very low animal cruelty conviction
rate in Connecticut; that the Act focuses on the broad goal of pursuing the
interests of justice rather than on using the "best interests" paradigm cre-
ated for cases involving children; that attaining convictions for animal
abuse may protect humans from abuse as well; and that under the Act
judges have discretion regarding whether to utilize advocates
67 -in the au-
thor's view, the Connecticut Act's benefits outweigh its limited slippery-
slope risks. The Act is a reminder that despite the foundational differences
between animal welfare supporters and animal rights supporters, in many
instances they may be able to come together regarding practical steps to
help animals.
D. Embracing Legal Reform from an Animal Welfare Perspective
Animal welfare supporters should consider two realities. First, as ad-
dressed above, virtually all animal-protection legal reform entails some
animal rights slippery-slope risks.68 Second, humans' moral responsibility
regarding animals demands that animal welfare advocates support appro-
priate reform to lessen animals' suffering. The two realities connect in
consideration of whether proposed reform is appropriate. In many cases,
such as with the Connecticut advocacy Act, proposed reforms that present
a particularly slippery slope regarding animal personhood can and should
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., id. (providing statements from several supporters of the bill).
64. See ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, JURISDICTIONS WITH FELONY ANIMAL ABUSE PROVISIONS
(2012), http://aldf.org/downloads/FelonyStatus List%204-12.pdf.
65. Chris Berry, All 50 States Now Have Felony Animal Cruelty Provisions!, ANIMAL LEGAL
DEF. FUND (Mar. 14, 2014), http://aldf.orgIblog/50-states-now-have-felony-animal-cruelty-provi-
slons.
66. See, e.g., Corwin R. Kruse, Baby Steps: Minnesota Raises Certain Forms ofAnimal Cruelty
to Felony Status, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1649, 1668-69 (2002) (asserting that making some forms
of animal cruelty a felony in Minnesota "would have been impossible" absent evidence of a link be-
tween animal cruelty and cruelty toward humans).
67. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-86n(a) (West 2016).
68. See supra Section II.B.
874 [Vol. 95:4
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be altered to achieve the same concrete benefits for animals. Amending
the Connecticut bill to eliminate the "animal's best interests" language6 9
and to focus on the advocacy for the interests of justice apparently did not
weaken its effectiveness. Further, the amendment significantly lessened
concerns that creating this new kind of statute could be a step toward cre-
ating legal standing for animals.
In addition to thoughtfully balancing the risks and benefits of pro-
posed legal changes regarding animals in deciding what to support, animal
welfare advocates can lessen slippery-slope concerns by communicating
about them. In a 2016 article in the Cincinnati Law Review, the author
highlighted the significance of social scientists' paradigm of "framing" in
communications relating to animals' legal status.7 0 Framing is "to select
some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a com-
municating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem defini-
tion, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommen-
dation."7 1
The Connecticut Act illustrates the significance of framing in animal
law issues. Framing the Act primarily as a step toward treating animals the
way we treat humans in courts would likely lead to significantly different
perceptions of the law than framing it as providing courts access to helpful
legal research and assistance to further the pursuit of justice in animal cru-
elty cases, while highlighting that the law does not treat animals as per-
sons.
Animal welfare proponents supporting worthy legal reforms such as
the Connecticut Act can mitigate slippery-slope concerns by participating
in the framing process, emphasizing how the reforms are desirable within
an evolving and vibrant animal welfare paradigm. Just as the framing of
sensible animal welfare reforms as steps toward animal rights makes those
reforms more dangerous, framing animal welfare reforms appropriately in
terms of human moral responsibility-rather than as steps toward legal
rights and personhood-lessens the reforms' risks.
In this period of rapid evolution regarding attitudes toward animals,
society is appropriately demanding thoughtful reform, and those commit-
ted to an animal welfare paradigm must heed this call. Failing to walk out
on some slippery slopes would not be good for animals and would lead to
societal irrelevance. It must be recognized that, in addition to the dangers
of walking on slippery slopes, there are costs in avoiding them altogether
69. CONN. GEN. ASSEMB. OFFICE LEGIS. RES., OLR BILL ANALYSIS: SHB 5344 (AS AMENDED
BY HOUSE "A") (Conn. 2016), https://www.cga.ct.gov/2016/BA/2016HB-05344-RO 10740-BA.htm.
70. Cupp, supra note 16, at 1038-40.
71. Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification ofa Fractured Paradigm, 43 J. COMM.
51, 52 (1993).
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when the slopes are inevitable features of good paths toward an important
72destination.
72. See Cupp, supra note 16, at 1050 (regarding the animal welfare paradigm's need to embrace
evolution despite dangers: "Sometimes treading with thoughtful preparation on a slippery slope may
be safer than trying to permanently stand still on a narrow ledge of a steep cliff.").
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